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INTRODUCTION 
In spite of pious pronouncements to the contrary, the Olympic 
Games are now political events. It is unfortunate; it is unnecessary; 
but it is a fact. The first "political" Olympiad was probably the 1936 
Games in Berlin, intended by the German hosts to be a showcase of 
Nazi superiority. In more recent times boycotts have become an Olym-
pic issue, but the problem which is exercising most minds at present 
is that of terrorism.1 When people think of terrorism and the Olympic 
Games they tend to remember Munich in 1972, although that was 
not the first occasion when political violence disrupted the Games. 
That particular distinction goes to Mexico, host of the 1968 Games. 
Montreal and Moscow were free of political violence only at the cost 
of elaborate security. Similar arrangements are being undertaken for 
Los Angeles. But what of the terrorist threat? This essay will attempt 
to analyse the nature ofthat threat with a view to provoking reflection 
rather than alarm. 
NATURE OF THE THREAT 
To determine whether it is reasonable to assume that terrorism 
is a genuine threat to the 1984 Olympics, one must first examine the 
nature of terrorism in the contemporary era, and second, decide if 
the Olympics offer a useful forum for contemporary terrorism. Turn-
ing to the first issue, recent trends give little cause for optimism. From 
a purely quantitative viewpoint, it is not possible to give a definitive 
statement on trends in international terrorism; it rather depends on 
one's definition of 'international' and what one considers a terrorist 
incident. It is often difficult to draw a clear distinction between ter-
rorism and the violence associated with a revolutionary or civil war. 
Consequently, the statistics point in different directions, depending 
on which statistics are chosen. For example, the U.S. State Department 
says that figures for 1982 showed a slight decline,-' while Brian Jenkins, 
world-renowned analyst at the RAND Corporation, suggests that in-
ternational incidents increased by 30%3 over the same period. The 
direction of the trend really does not matter, for regardless of the 
statistics, there is still a great deal of terrorism going on. Moreover, 
percentages aside, government and independent analysts are largely-
agreed on a number of qualitative and methodological trends which 
may be of greater importance to most studies on terrorism. 
First, the groups themselves are more numerous — many of those 
most active today did not exist a decade ago. They are smaller, more 
37 
Summer 1983 
skilled and more professional. Training, discipline, security and tech-
nical skills are to a higher standard, out of necessity for as governments 
responded with increasing sophistication and effectiveness, terrorists 
had to adapt or face defeat.4 
Second, as a result of this choice, the crazy, one-off, symbolic act 
seems to have become less common while the carefully-planned, di-
rected, "rational" act is increasing. Terrorism purely for mass shock 
effect, "terrorism as theatre," cannot be ruled out, but the trend in 
the 1980s seems to be toward terrorism for specific purposes.5 
Third, that inclination to "issue oriented" terrorism, linked to 
popular causes, represents a significant shift and may be the most 
important change in terrorism in this decade.6 It opens up a whole 
new set of potential targets which provide opportunities for incidents 
that are both purposive and demonstrative. Here the anarchist con-
cept of "Direct Action" may be most instructive. Direct action implies 
taking protest or resistance actions of either a violent or a non-violent 
nature and which have immediate socio-political results. It is central 
to anarchist thought. Furthermore, the linking of direct action meth-
ods to popular issues, such as environmental, anti-technological, or 
anti-nuclear movements, is part of the modern anarchist tradition.7 
Clearly, some methodological and doctrinal transference has taken 
place. 
Fourth, there is a demonstrated tendency towards greater ruth-
lessness and increased deadliness. Bombing and assassination are still 
the most common forms of attack, with the bombs getting bigger and, 
hence, more indiscriminate. This growing tendency to target people 
rather than property is reflected statistically: over the past decade the 
proportion of human targets has increased from only 20% of the total 
number of targets to a current level of approximately 50%. Diplomats 
remain the most frequent targets and Americans are the highest na-
tional category — attacks on U.S. property and persons rose by 60% 
in 1982.8 This type of terrorism is occurring in more countries with 
North America experiencing a significant increase in 1982. Again, 
the United States was the principal target.9 
Taken together these broad trends suggest that a generalized 
threat exists, although it is difficult at this stage to predict the specific 
form it might take. Before attempting to define the threat more clearly, 
it is essential to describe what the Los Angeles Olympics might offer 
to the would-be terrorist. 
The first and most important asset the Olympics offers is pub-
licity. The importance of publicity to terrorist groups is well under-
stood and needs no further elaboration. It is a sine qua non of existence, 
let alone success.10 Moreover, terrorism's attraction as a media 'event' 
is also a matter of record. The two feed on each other in symbiotic 
relationship." Nothing demonstrated this better than the terrorist 
attack on the 1972 Munich Olympics. The terrorists understood how 
to use the media coverage of the Olympics as a platform to play their 
own 'game' before a global audience.12 Media coverage of the Los 
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Angeles Olympics will be even more extensive with American and 
foreign broadcasters expecting to reach an audience of 2.5 billion 
people.13 Spectacular 'terrorism as theatre' operations may be less 
frequent now, but the publicity potential of the Los Angeles events 
may be too tempting to ignore. 
If the object is extortion, attempting to coerce the U.S. or some 
other government into following a certain course of action, then the 
Los Angeles Olympic site offers a number of targets of opportunity. 
There will be American dignitaries, including the U.S. President and 
presidential candidates as well as leaders of less than stable or popular 
regimes. The athletes themselves, 5,200 in all, are always potential 
hostages. They will be competing at 23 different locations around Los 
Angeles County, thus complicating the task of protecting them while, 
temptingly located on the UCLA campus, site of one of the Olympic 
villages, is a small nuclear reactor.M However, in order to make their 
presence felt, a terrorist group need not strike directly at the Games' 
sites. As a major industrial and port city of some three million people, 
Los Angeles offers a multitude of commercial, government, industrial 
and military targets. It simply will not be possible to protect them all, 
or to guarantee complete, fail-safe security for even the most obvious, 
important ones. Provided that a terrorist group makes the right choice 
and attacks in strength, it might, indeed, find itself with sufficient 
leverage to accomplish its intended extortion. Were the threat, whether 
real or a hoax, sufficiently severe (for example, a nuclear device on 
a freighter in the harbour) the group would additionally get all the 
publicity they desired from the massive media apparatus assembled 
to cover the Games. 
Obviously, any incident of significant magnitude would be a mat-
ter of considerable embarrassment to the host city and, more impor-
tant, to the host country — especially in the midst of a Presidential 
election campaign. The assassination of a visiting dignitary or of an 
athletic team would discredit the costly efforts to prevent such an 
occurrence and might call into question the continuation of disrupted 
Games. Nonetheless, a race riot in downtown Los Angeles, replete 
with black smoke billowing over the Coliseum and television images 
of disadvantaged minorities being beaten by police, could do as much 
damage. When a country hosts the Olympics, it puts its political, social 
and international prestige on the line. In today's world that is an 
extremely vulnerable commodity. It is small comfort that the list of 
those likely to attempt to damage that commodity is probably rather 
small. 
The list of terrorist groups which might wish to carry out an 
operation at the Games is so long that it defies meaningful cataloguing. 
Fortunately, most would not have both the will and the wherewithal 
to penetrate the security screen, with all the risk that would entail. 
Olympic site security is unlikely to be 'fail-safe,' but neither will it be 
easy to penetrate. The Olympics' security forces may total as many as 
17,000 persons — comparable to forces deployed for the Montreal 
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Games — and are likely to include military and counter-terrorist units 
in addition to large numbers of police.15 The adequacy of these ar-
rangements, and American preparedness to deal with terrorism in 
general, are matters of some debate,16 but the mere scale of the se-
curity is likely to deter all but the most determined. 
Security apart, the Olympics simply might not suit the operational 
style of some groups. More and more terrorists are turning to 'hit 
and run' actions,17 which offer little risk to the perpetrators, rather 
than static 'grandstand shows' such as hostage-takings which involve 
a high risk for the terrorist. It is possible, therefore, to draft a kind 
of 'short list' of likely groups who might have both the motivation 
and the resources to carry out an attack and, under their own terms, 
have the expectation of a reasonable return on their investment. This 
list includes, probably among others, the groups discussed below. 
Armenians 
Two main groups, ASALA (American Secret Army for the Lib-
eration of Armenia) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian 
Genocide present some danger. The former is thought to have links 
with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and possibly the 
Soviet Union, while the latter is alleged to have private Armenian 
backers in the United States. Both groups are motivated by desire to 
revenge the 'genocide' carried out by the Turks against the Armenian 
population during the First World War. ASALA and the Justice Com-
mandos concentrate on Turkish targets internationally, especially dip-
lomats. Assassination is the preferred technique, but bombings and 
hostage-takings have also been undertaken to coerce Western gov-
ernments into releasing jailed members. Ruthlessness and determi-
nation are the hallmarks of Armenian terrorism and neither group 
would be deterred by a high degree of security if it could possibly kill 
some Turks. These groups are probably the most active, if not the 
most professional, in the current arena of international terrorism, 
and they could be expected to reconnoitre the Olympic sites and to 
stalk their quarry skillfully. Although inclined toward hit and run 
bombings or assassinations, they would probably resort quickly to 
holding hostages if cornered by security forces. They would find shel-
ter and assistance among the 675,000 Armenians who live in the 
United States, 100,000 in the Los Angeles area alone. Earlier this year 
a Turkish newspaper reported that an Armenian financier was at-
tempting to smuggle sixty-five Armenian terrorists into the United 
States.17 
Black June Organization 
Also known as Al Asifa, (Fatah — The Revolutionary Council) or 
as the Abu Nidal group after its leader Sabri Khalil al-Banna (Abu 
Nidal), Black June is among the most militant of the Palestinian groups, 
opposed to any diplomatic solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
has accused Yasir Arafat of being too 'soft' on the Israelis. Indeed, 
this group may be among those elements of the PLO that have rebelled 
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recently against Arafat's leadership. In April 1983 the group claimed 
responsibility for the assassination of PLO moderate Issam Sartawi. 
Black June's membership, thought to number about 500, is spread 
through Europe, with cells in most European capitals. The organi-
zation clearly enjoys Iraqi sponsorship, but it is not obvious if the 
relationship is closer, with Iraq exerting a more direct influence. The 
list of potential targets is extensive: Israelis, non-Israeli Jews, Amer-
icans (especially American government officials), British officials, Syr-
ians and Iranians. Like the Armenians, Black June terrorists are 
professional and ruthless assassins and are capable of producing pow-
erful, sophisticated bombs. Although they have not carried out any 
attacks in the United States thus far, it may be difficult for them to 
ignore the possibilities offered by the Olympics.18 
Anti-Nuclear Groups 
In this case it may not be possible to identify one particular group. 
Nuclear power and nuclear wespons are emotive issues in the United 
States and in Europe. Most of the opposition is peaceful but certain 
extreme elements might be prepared to use the Olympics as a platform 
for more violent actions. If the deployment of American cruise missiles 
in Europe goes forward in 1984, that could prove to be the trigger 
for violent anti-nuclear terrorism. In this case, West German terrorists 
could be in the forefront: the organization which comes to mind is 
the Revolutionary Cells, technically not a single group but a loose 
alliance of independent teams, each consisting of as few as two to five 
people. Although they have been involved for some time in illegal 
activity, lending assistance to various West German and foreign un-
derground groups, since the late 1970s they have surpassed even the 
second-generation Red Army Faction to become the most dangerous 
group in West Germany. They are further believed to draw some 
support from more extreme elements in the West German peace 
movement. The motive for an operation at the Olympics could be 
pure revenge for deployment of the weapons, or a desire to coerce 
the Americans or West Germans into removing them. Likely targets 
would be American or West German officials or athletes, the Olympic 
site, or Los Angeles itself. Bombing and arson are the Cells' normal 
methods, and thus far they have confined their activities to West 
Germany. They might be inclined, however, to take more dramatic 
aciton in the United States if the missile deployments proceed in spite 
of their protest activities. The most worrisome aspect of the Revo-
lutionary Cells is how little is known about them. So tight is their 
security that only five members have been identified and none has 
been caught.19 
The Revolutionary Cells are not the only European Group which 
might "co-opt" the nuclear issue to dramatize its own cause. The Irish 
National Liberation Army (INLA), although less well-known than the 
Provisional IRA, is nonetheless a force to be reckoned with. The INLA 
is a revolutionary Irish nationalist group, Marxist with Trotskyite 
overtones. It was formed in 1975 as the military wing of the Irish 
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Republican Socialist Party, which had been created out of a violent 
schism within the official IRA. Based in Dublin, it has recruited drop-
outs from the Provisionals and is considered now to number approx-
imately 200, about half of whom are directly involved in terrorist 
operations. Repeatedly decimated by internal feuds and arrests by 
the security forces, the INLA has demonstrated a remarkable capacity 
to rebuild. Within Northern Ireland even the Provisionals regard 
them as reckless amateurs, but lack of sophistication is more than 
compensated for by ruthlessness. More significant for this study is the 
fact that the INLA has carried out a number of operations against 
British targets in Europe. Furthermore, the group is known to have 
links to the European extreme left and to the Soviet bloc, the principal 
source of the group's weapons. Some of its operations have been 
directed against western defence installations and have been ex-
plained by the group in "anti-imperialist" terms. Such leftist tend-
encies preclude the INLA from acquiring a large following in the 
United States, yet their willingness to operate abroad raises the pos-
sibility of an attack on British athletes or officials at the Olympics. 
Moreover, its leftist ideology along with European and Soviet bloc 
connections, should alert security planners to the possibility that any 
INLA activity could take on anti-NATO or anti-American overtones. 
Like the Revolutionary Cells, the INLA might find Los Angeles an 
appropriate location for exploiting the anti-nuclear issue while fur-
thering its own cause.20 
The American anti-nuclear scene is much more diffuse and less 
inclined to terrorist-style violence. The nuclear debate in the United 
States is largely verbal and, when it does become activist, it is pre-
dominantly non-violent, oriented more toward civil disobedience. Some 
analysts fear that non-violence may not prevail in the long term, es-
pecially if peaceful or near-peaceful protest does not appear to change 
or influence administration policy.'21 Insofar as the Olympics are con-
cerned the domestic 'threat' could be twofold: a dramatic, largely 
symbolic gesture of protest by mainstream anti-nuclear activists (per-
haps an attempt to occupy the UCLA reactor site) intended to dram-
atize the danger of nuclear war, or, a violent incident in which, as 
suggested earlier, a terrorist group not normally associated with the 
nuclear issue uses it for its own purposes. In the latter instance one 
American terrorist group, the Puerto Rican FALN, comes to mind. 
The FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation) 
There are at least a half dozen Puerto Rican terrorist groups, but 
only one, the FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation), has been 
operating on a regular basis in the continental United States. Dedi-
cated to an armed struggle for Puerto Rican independence, the FALN's 
principal theatre is the mainland, where about 40% of all Puerto 
Ricans live. It is thought by police to have supporters and cells in 
many of the major cities and in other areas, including California. Its 
actual strength is not known for certain though law enforcement 
agencies estimate the FALN has approximately 30 to 40 hard-core 
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terrorists. Bombing has been the predominant FALN technique, with 
American businesses being the prime target. The announced inten-
tion is often to force the release of jailed FALN members or to take 
revenge for some act by authorities, such as the arrest or conviction 
of FALN members. The Olympics would be an appropriate 'theatre' 
for FALN to make its case for Puerto Rican independence in a highly 
visible way. If the incident could be contrived to exploit the nuclear 
issue simultaneously, it might gain the FALN leverage, publicity and 
popular support. It is not possible to predict exactly how this might 
be achieved. Suffice it to say that in the current climate of opinion 
any administration presented with a choice between saving human 
lives and saving nuclear policies or installations would find itself hard 
pressed to preserve the latter. With Olympics as a forum and the 
election campaign as a backdrop, nuclear policy and national self-
determination could prove to be a very potent combination. That 
said, it would not do to overstate the magnitude of such a threat for 
the FALN has not shown much inclination toward hostage-taking, 
preferring to attack unprotected property rather than people. There-
fore it is far more likely that they would adhere to their familiar 
bombing tactics. In that case, business and financial establishments 
and federal law enforcement institutions in the Los Angeles area 
would be potential targets. A new twist could be added, namely, Mex-
ican targets, if the Mexican authorities are still holding William Mo-
rales, a former fugitive and key figure in the FALN, when the Olympics 
commence.22 
Anti-Castro Cubans 
There is in the United States a multitude of anti-Castro Cuban 
groups, even though only a few might be inclined to undertake actions 
at the Olympics. The most active of these is Omega 7, a small but 
efficient group that operates against Cuban officials and anyone else 
who opposes the group's anti-communist stance. In the past the group 
has carried out both bombings and assassinations. Apparently satisfied 
with the anti-communist policies of the Reagan administration, Om-
ega 7 has been largely dormant since 1980. However, the attendance 
of a large contingent of Cuban athletes and their accompanying of-
ficials may prompt a terrorist action. Another anti-Castro group, called 
Cuban Action, is Los Angeles based. Unhappily, not enough is known 
about it to determine whether it poses a significant threat in itself. 
Serving as a local organizational base for Omega 7, however, it could 
be quite important. In any case, the dedication and ruthlessness of 
these groups makes them a serious potential threat to the Cuban 
delegation, as well as to those contingents from the Soviet Union and 
other Soviet bloc countries.23 
Others 
The foregoing survey was not intended to be definitive or ex-
haustive. It should not be taken to mean that other groups might not 
attempt some action at the Olympics. A threat may yet reside in the 
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myriad of organizations that make up the American radical left un-
derground, although recent experience suggests that they are too 
fragmented, erratic and unpredictable to assess with any expectation 
of accuracy. Nor do any of them have the sophistication and resources 
of the more professional groups discussed here. Further, many of 
these are likely to be deterred by the Olympics security show of force, 
but they could still be a threat to "targets of opportunity."24 There 
are also a number of "wild cards" on the international scene including 
the Iranians and the Libyans. Although past experience indicates 
involvement in international terrorism, there is not enough evidence 
in the public domain upon which to draw reasonable conclusions about 
a potential threat to the Olympics. In view of the implacable hostility 
of the Libyan and Iranian regimes to the United States, however, they 
cannot be ignored completely. Finally, there is the question of the 
Soviet Union. Clearly stung by the American-led boycott of their 1980 
Games, the Soviets indicated to the Olympic organizing committee in 
1982 that they might boycott the Los Angeles event.-5 Unfortunately, 
in the same manner that western nations justified their boycott — as 
a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — there is no shortage 
of controversial American policy issues (Central America or NATO 
nuclear modernization) which could be seized upon by the Soviets to 
justify a boycott of their own. Whether they do so obviously remains 
to be seen. Such a boycott would be a two-edged sword, since the 
competitions give the Soviets ample opportunity to demonstrate their 
'superiority' in sports. Moreover, it might backfire in the long run, 
damaging the prospects of a closer relationship with a possible Dem-
ocratic presidential administration after the 1984 elections. In fact, 
were the Soviet regime truly determined to disrupt the Games and 
embarrass the United States, a boycott is not their only option. In 
1968 KGB agents played a major role in the disturbances that over-
shadowed the Mexico City Olympiad.-'6 They are hardly likely to un-
dertake anything so brazen on American territory, at least directly. 
Certainly the DGI (the Cuban secret service), which is believed to be 
under KGB control, could act as a surrogate. Its ability to blend easily 
into the Hispanic community would be a considerable asset, partic-
ularly if the desired action was a racial incident or riot.27 
SUMMARY 
It has to be admitted that the foregoing cannot amount to more 
than an 'informed speculation.' It is quite possible that the Los Angeles 
Olympics will pass without a major incident, in which case this essay 
can be consigned to history as an idiosyncratic reflection of the con-
temporary fascination with terrorism. Still, the possibility that some-
thing might happen cannot be dismissed out of hand. The global 
trends in terrorism point to a proliferation of smaller, more efficient 
groups, violence spreading to more countries, higher casualties and 
a tendency to link terrorism to popular issues. The Olympics offer a 
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multitude of targets, human and otherwise, global publicity, potential 
opportunities to embarrass or humiliate a superpower and, depending 
on the choice of method, target and circumstances, leverage for ex-
tortion of varying degrees of intensity. Finally, there are at least half 
a dozen terrorist groups with the resources and motivation to attempt 
an operation at the Olympics. 
Risk, it is said, is the sum of probability plus capability plus con-
sequences. The capability for and the consequences of a terrorist 
incident at the Olympics are quite clear. It is up to the Olympic security 
forces to reduce the probability and thereby to foreclose the comple-
tion of the lethal equation. 
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